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Abstract 
The conflict in Ukraine has prompted analyses about the return of cold war divisions to Europe. Thus, 
this study focuses on the role the news media plays in the conflict by examining how the visual and 
textual practices of news framing help constitute geopolitical rationality and legitimise foreign policy. 
We analyse how the framing of the conflict in Die Welt, Dagens Nyheter, Helsingin Sanomat and The 
Guardian developed through four key events between February 2014 and February 2015. The 
analysis indicates that by promoting particular news frames the newspapers contributed to the 
legitimation of European Union policies, which are premised upon supporting the Ukrainian 
government in its military campaign in eastern Ukraine and placing responsibility for the conflict 
onto Russia. Hence, we argue that the news framing eventually contributed to the naturalisation of 
the ‘new cold war’ as a geopolitical rationality, orienting and legitimising foreign policy in Europe. 
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Introduction 
 
With over 9,000 deaths, 20,000 injured, more than 1,6 million people displaced domestically and 
internationally and 5 million in need of humanitarian assistance (European Commission, 2016), the 
Ukrainian crisis has become the largest humanitarian tragedy Europe has witnessed since the 1990’s 
wars in the Balkans. While having complex roots in Ukraine’s post-communist developments, 
including continuous power struggles between competing oligarchs, weak state structures, a poor 
economy and profound inequality and social insecurity (Ishchenko, 2014; Wilson, 2009), the conflict 
also has major international dimensions. Hence, against a background of longstanding disputes 
between Western powers and Russia concerning the economic and military alignment of formerly 
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socialist countries and Soviet states – and the eastward spread of both the EU and NATO (Haukkala, 
2015; Sakwa, 2015), the close involvement of perceived superpower interests in Ukraine have 
rendered geopolitical interpretations integral elements in explaining the Ukrainian conflict (e.g. 
Legvold, 2014; Rutland, 2015; Wade, 2015). As the United States and the EU, on one hand, and 
Russia, on the other, have aligned with opposite sides of the warring camps in Ukraine, a ‘new cold 
war’ narrative of international relations has increasingly taken hold of mainstream political discourse. 
 
With European governments closely involved in the conflict since its outbreak, national news media 
in Europe have had a major stake in its coverage in at least two respects. Firstly, studies in popular 
geopolitics demonstrate that the geopolitical is not limited to the practices of state and military elites: 
the media contribute to the daily production of the geopolitical imagination, involving the drawing of 
boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘others’ as well as developing and disseminating interpretations of 
security and threat (Ó Tuathail, 1996; Mamadouh and Dijkink, 2006). Secondly, due to the 
proliferation and globalisation of media platforms and the emergence of almost real-time conflict 
reporting, conflicts have become increasingly mediatised and, therefore, the particular ways in which 
they are constituted in the media can have a significant bearing on their development and outcomes 
(Cottle, 2006; Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010; Eskjær et al., 2015). By shaping elite and popular 
perceptions of the Ukrainian conflict and its participants, the news media can both legitimise and 
constrain the actual foreign policy decisions of European governments. 
 
Thus, it is important to ask how the legitimation of particular political responses to a conflict may be 
supported by news frames that accentuate certain perspectives on reality over others. This paper draws 
from the field of popular geopolitics and focuses on the role of news frames – constituted in the 
interplay of visual and textual representations – in guiding the public interpretation of international 
conflicts and in rationalising foreign policy. We specifically inquire into the way in which four 
leading national newspapers in Western Europe have framed key events in the Ukrainian conflict and 
how these framings have aligned with European Union policies and positions. A broader concern is 
to ask to what extent national newspapers and journalists in Europe may be guided by and also 
contribute to the naturalisation of the ‘new cold war’ as a dominant geopolitical rationality – 
something which both positions and legitimises Western foreign policy. 
 
The geopolitics of conflict framing in foreign news 
Geopolitics, the practice and study of foreign policy in terms of political geography, occupies a central 
position in the global imagination, organising the world into a hierarchy of places, states and blocs 
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(Agnew, 1998; Dalby, 2008). Within the geopolitical rationality, nations and regions are attributed 
unitary political, economic and military interests, and international relations becomes a global game 
in which clashes over these interests are played out (Kelly, 2006). National and international media 
are closely involved in the reproduction and normalisation of geopolitical narratives (Dittmer, 2010; 
Mamadouh and Dijkink, 2006; Sharp, 1996), and the relevance of the media constructions of 
geopolitical relations are accentuated at times of international conflict (Robison, 2004).  
 
As the news media participate in the public sense-making of a conflict, they engage in the process of 
framing, a social and cognitive process in which a situation is defined in order to make human action 
possible (Goffman, 1986: 10–11; Reese, 2001: 7). Determining what is brought into an audience’s 
‘field of perception’ (Butler, 2005: 823) is a central element in news framing and entails various 
editorial decisions, including the selection of one viewpoint over others. News frames – as outcomes 
of this process – are ‘interpretive packages’ (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989: 3) that both journalists 
and their readers depend on (Gitlin, 1980: 7), suggesting certain problem definitions, causal 
diagnoses, remedies and moral judgements of responsibility (Entman, 1993). Given the power of 
news frames to shape public interpretations of conflicts, their causes and the actors involved, the 
media may prescribe individual foreign policy decisions and delimit policy options, creating strong 
incentives for governments to intervene, or not, in favour of certain parties (e.g. Hammond, 2000; 
Robison, 2004; Roger, 2013). 
 
Before the dissolution of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, for decades the notion of the cold 
war had provided a powerful narrative of international relations with which to explain complex 
military and political events in international news and mainstream political discourse (Hanson, 1995; 
Norris, 1995). Prescribing an ideological and military rivalry between East and West, it not only aided 
in the orientation of Western foreign policy by placing the Soviet Union as the primary threat to 
national and international security (Meyer, 1995), but also helped legitimise and naturalise those 
policies in the public sphere (Herman and Chomsky, 2008). The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the 
demise of the cold war as a coherent narrative for mapping world politics, and reporting on 
international conflicts became increasingly complex for journalism (e.g. Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 
2010; Norris, 1995). 
 
However, having become deeply entrenched in the geopolitical imagination, the East-West division 
never completely withered away. With the deterioration of the relationship between the West and 
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Russia over the past decade, cold war rhetoric has clawed its way back into international policy 
discourse and has been particularly notable during the 2008 Russo-Georgian war and most recently 
in the Ukrainian conflict (Monaghan, 2015; Sakwa, 2008). Consequently, the ‘new cold war’ may be 
turning into a suggestive narrative for Western news media, with the potential consequence of 
contributing to the public legitimation of increasingly militaristic foreign policy positions in Europe. 
 
Material and method 
To study how the mainstream press in Western Europe frames the Ukrainian conflict, we analyse and 
compare the coverage of the conflict in four nationwide daily newspapers: The Guardian, Die Welt, 
Dagens Nyheter (DN) and Helsingin Sanomat (HS). Ranking amongst the most widely read quality 
dailies in their countries1, the four are important national agenda-setters and thus have a key role in 
the reproduction of elite foreign policy discourses and geopolitical narratives. In the selection of 
suitable data for analysis, we set out from two main premises with regard to news framing. Firstly, 
we assumed that widely mediatised occurrences of violence, deaths and suffering have particular 
relevance in the public framing of a conflict as they tend to induce strong emotions, highlight 
questions of guilt and responsibility, and assert the sense that there is a moral obligation for people 
and governments to act (Chouliaraki, 2008; Parry, 2010). Accordingly, the data was gathered from 
four periods in the Ukrainian conflict between February 2014 and February 2015 (see Table 1). Each 
period was associated with violent incidents, armed combat and heightened international media 
exposure and could thus be considered key in shaping the dominant framings of the conflict in the 
newspapers. 
 
Secondly, we presumed that various visual cues, most notably photographs and images, the placement 
of stories, the size of headlines and other typographical decisions, are key factors in influencing the 
salience and perceived importance of the stories in the newspapers (Coleman, 2010; Zillmann et al., 
2001). Photographs, in particular, highlight the importance of stories, and, due to their power to 
induce emotions and their effectiveness in conveying implicit reality claims not easily recognised by 
the audience, they often direct the interpretation of news stories (Brantner et al., 2011; Messaris and 
Abraham, 2001). Accordingly, the significance of photographs has been subject to increasing 
attention in studies on the media coverage of war and crises (e.g. Butler, 2005; Pantti, 2013; Parry, 
2010; Roger, 2013; Solaroli, 2011; Zelizer, 2004). Yet at the same time, the actual meaning given to 
images is partly dependent on how they are defined by their textual context, consisting primarily of 
the caption as well as the headline of the accompanying story (Coleman, 2010; Wilkes, 2015). It was 
thus our contention that the analysis of the Ukrainian conflict frames should take into account both 
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the visual and textual cues of the articles because they work together to increase salience, create 
strong impressions and induce emotional engagement.  
 
To facilitate such observation, we manually scanned the newspapers for articles that explicitly dealt 
with events connected to the conflict and decided to concentrate the analysis on those that contained 
images. The material from Die Welt, DN and HS was collected from the printed editions. However, 
due to the unavailability of its print edition to us when we conducted the study, we settled for 
reviewing the online versions of The Guardian articles2. For coding purposes, we regarded a 
combination of image(s) and text(s) laid out on a single page or a spread and covering the event from 
a relatively consistent point-of-view as our unit of analysis. As a result, a unit of analysis consisted 
of the main story, often written by a foreign correspondent from the scene of events, which was 
accompanied by one or several photos, and which could include a related comment, sidebar or 
background article. In total, the analysed material comprised 402 units of images and text from 38 
days of coverage (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Breakdown of the analysed data (total number of units of analysis: 402) 
 
Data collection 
period 
Key events during the period Number of units of analysis per 
newspaper 
21–27 February 
2014 (‘Maidan’) 
Maidan demonstrators and police shot during riots 
in Kiev; Yanukovych flees to Russia; Parliament 
votes to remove Yanukovych from power; protests 
in eastern Ukraine; unrest and Russian activity in 
Crimea 
Die Welt:16 
DN: 21 
HS: 21 
The Guardian (online): 32 
Total: 90 
3–7 May 2014 
(‘Odessa’) 
Violent riots in Odessa; anti-government activists 
killed when trade union building set on fire; clashes 
between insurgents and the army in eastern Ukraine 
Die Welt: 12 
DN: 14 
HS: 9 
The Guardian (online): 15 
Total: 50 
18–31 July 2014 
(‘MH17’) 
Malaysian Airlines flight MH17 shot down in 
eastern Ukraine; the EU and the US set new 
sanctions against Russia; intense battles in eastern 
Ukraine 
Die Welt: 32 
DN: 26 
HS: 28 
The Guardian (online): 82 
Total: 169 
11–22 February 
2015 (‘Minsk’) 
International ceasefire agreement signed in Minsk; 
heavy fighting in eastern Ukraine; insurgents seize 
the city of Debaltseve 
Die Welt: 25 
DN: 14 
HS: 23 
The Guardian (online): 32 
Total: 94 
 
The framing analysis combined qualitative and quantitative methodology. Firstly, through a close 
reading of the material, we inductively worked out the principal news topics as defined by images 
and headlines, while also paying attention to earlier studies of conflict framing (Dimitrova and 
Strömbäck, 2005; Pantti, 2013; Parry, 2010). Subsequently, we coded each unit of analysis in the 
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material separately, allowing us to uncover underlying patterns and differences in the coverage. In 
addition to documenting the primary visual and textual topics, the coding focused on the identification 
and representation of various actors, including protesters, soldiers, insurgents and political leaders in 
the images, headlines and captions. The coding of actor representations, on a positive-neutral-
negative scale, was based on a consideration of the role the headline, caption or image attributed to 
the identified actors in the events reported (e.g. an aggressor, victim, protestor, mediator, hero). A 
representation of the people in the Maidan square, for instance, was considered positive if it presented 
them as peaceful protesters or victims of police violence, but negative if it focused attention on the 
armed and far-right elements among the protesters. A positive representation would associate the 
political power or leader with, for instance, peace efforts, widespread popular support or a position 
of power and influence among other leaders, whereas a negative representation would associate the 
leader with aggression, criminality, authoritarianism, isolation or a position of weakness. Each unit 
of analysis was coded by one of two coders, with a percent agreement between the coders (Neuendorf, 
2002: 149) established at .80 on the primary visual and .80 on the primary textual topic, .91 for the 
general identification of actors and .82 for their representations. 
 
In the third and final stage of analysis, we qualitatively worked out the dominant frames employed 
by the newspapers for each of the studied periods. Starting from the premises that news frames, on 
the one hand, develop within the broader political and cultural context in which the newspapers 
operate (cf. Reese, 2010; Vliegenthart and van Zoonen, 2011), and, on the other hand, are strategic 
devices that can be used to legitimise certain political outlooks and foreign policy decisions (Pan and 
Kosicki 2001; Reese 2010), we aimed at an overall interpretation of the news coverage in relation to 
the actions and aims of the parties to the conflict. Thus, we observed the news coverage against the 
background of the unfolding events in the Ukrainian conflict3, paying specific attention to official EU 
actions and positions on the developments4. By marking common patterns in the coverage and by 
testing our interpretations against the coding results from the previous stage of analysis, we thus 
worked out the dominant frames that were shared by the papers during each of the studied periods, 
while also noting individual newspapers’ significant divergences from the overall pattern.  
 
Analysis 
Since the beginning of the Ukrainian conflict, precipitated by the decision of the Ukrainian 
government to halt talks on an association agreement with the EU in November 2013, European 
leaders have been closely involved in its key events. On 21 February 2014, when both protesters and 
police were shot at on the streets of Kiev, the foreign ministers of Germany, France and Poland 
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mediated negotiations between opposition leaders and Ukraine’s president, Viktor Yanukovych. 
However, within hours of the signing of an agreement on political reforms and new elections, 
Yanukovych fled the Ukrainian capital, armed protesters then stormed government buildings and the 
parliament and removed the president and the prime minister, Mykola Azarov, from power, installing 
Oleksandr Turchynov and Arseniy Yatsenyuk as interim president and prime minister, respectively. 
Whereas the Russian government reacted to the unexpected turn of events by condemning the regime 
change unconstitutional, and hence an effective coup, EU leaders dismissed the legal irregularities of 
the process and recognised the new government as legitimate. In subsequent months the EU, in 
coordination with the United States, kept the insolvent government afloat by extending it new loans 
through the IMF and, on 27 June 2014, sealed an association agreement with Ukraine. 
 
Maidan: People’s uprising 
 
As a breaking news event attended by international media outlets, the chaotic developments 
surrounding the fall of Yanukovych presented a key moment in shaping public perceptions of the 
nature of the Ukrainian conflict. Overall, the studied newspapers shared many elements in their 
coverage of the event: all published dramatic imagery of violent street riots and the covered bodies 
of shot protesters, identified Maidan demonstrators as victims of police brutality, represented the 
ousted president as a corrupt dictator and featured heroic images of the liberated opposition leader 
Yulia Tymoshenko. The dominant framing of the events as a people’s uprising was reminiscent of 
the popular Western narratives of the Arab spring (Cottle, 2011) and built legitimacy for the new 
coalition in power. Photos of celebrating citizens and the lightly-armed ‘people’s self-defence forces’ 
guarding administrative buildings in the days following the regime change further reinforced the 
interpretation. 
 
To differing extents the papers also brought attention to details which challenged the prevalent 
framing. The Guardian, DN and HS featured individual reports of anti-Maidan protests elsewhere in 
the country, thus acknowledging that not all Ukrainians were backing the regime change. In addition, 
DN and HS highlighted the existence of armed factions within the ranks of the Maidan demonstrators 
by picturing the arrival of the Lviv police force to support protesters. In one story, HS even focused 
on the role of the paramilitary Right Sector groups in the momentary breakdown of social order. 
However, while these reports somewhat destabilised the dominant framing of the events as a people’s 
revolution, they did not amount to a suggestion that the popular protests had been hijacked by 
organised far-right groups and turned into an armed grab of power – a framing highly influential, for 
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instance, among the Russian media and political establishment (TASS 2014; see also Ishchenko, 2015: 
155–6; Sakwa, 2015: 83–4). 
 
Even dismissing the circumstances in which it overtook the state apparatus, the legitimacy of the new 
coalition in power in Ukraine and the EU’s support for it could be critically questioned. The far-right 
Svoboda party obtained three positions in the new government, one of its founders was put in charge 
of national security, and paramilitary Right Sector groups were incorporated into the military as 
independent battalions (Sakwa, 2015: 95–7, 158), raising questions about the adherence of the new 
regime to ‘European values’. More importantly, the central government was soon targeting its own 
citizens again – only this time in eastern Ukraine. Indeed, while protests in Kiev abated after the 
regime change, unrest continued in eastern parts of the country, where major sections of the 
population regarded the new government as illegitimate. As the anti-government movement grew, 
the most militant elements took advantage and transformed the protests into a full-scale rebellion, 
occupying administrative buildings and police headquarters in several cities before proclaiming 
sovereignty for the Donetsk and Lugansk ‘People’s Republics’ on 7 April 2014 (Gessen, 2014). Kiev 
responded promptly by launching a military campaign against the insurgents, dubbing it an ‘anti-
terrorist operation’. 
 
Odessa: Divided nation 
 
In early May 2014, the army’s surge to recapture Donetsk from the rebels coincided with riots in 
Odessa, where over 40 anti-government protesters died when trapped inside a burning trade union 
building. The newspapers’ coverage of these events marked a significant shift in their framing of the 
conflict. Reports from Odessa and eastern Ukraine featured images of rioting activists, armed 
insurgents, Ukrainian soldiers, victims of violence and mourning civilians. In their stories from 
separatist-held cities, three of the four papers – Die Welt, DN and The Guardian – brought attention 
to the popular distrust of the Kiev government that was driving the rebels’ cause. Yet the reporting 
made sure not to confuse anti-government struggles with a people’s revolution against a repressive 
regime. With the exception of one article in DN, there were no victimising or heroic images of anti-
government protesters; nor were there depictions of regime brutality. As a result, the dominant 
framing of the events was one of a divided nation being cleaved into two antagonistic groups and 
rapidly descending into a civil war. 
 
Moreover, while this rift was presented from both sides, there were stark contrasts in the way the 
parties to the conflict were represented. Whereas the reporting on the February revolution identified 
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with Maidan protesters and de-humanised the security forces, the coverage in May featured fresh-
faced Ukrainian servicemen and depicted the Odessa police as victims of protesters’ aggression. 
Insurgents and anti-government activists were now pictured in threatening and aggressive poses. The 
observed pattern was repeated in the subsequent data collection periods. In the wake of the Minsk 
agreement in February 2015, all papers mostly covered the battles from the Ukrainian army’s 
perspective, including humanising imagery of soldiers playing football during a brief ceasefire and 
of exhausted servicemen being transferred home after fleeing from Debaltseve. In contrast, images 
of insurgents appeared primarily in the aftermath of the MH17 disaster, when they were seen as 
mostly armed and masked, patrolling the crash site and confronting international investigators and 
aid workers. Their habitual labelling as ‘pro-Russian separatists’ further contributed to the de-
legitimation of the anti-government insurgency by implying its non-patriotic and ‘un-Ukrainian’ 
nature (cf. Boyd-Barrett, 2015: 3–4). 
 
MH17: International atrocity 
 
The escalation of violence in eastern Ukraine did not prompt the EU to withdraw its support for the 
new government. On the contrary, the EU effectively adopted the Ukrainian government’s position 
of presenting the armed insurrection as supported, if not entirely controlled, by the Kremlin. 
Following the seizure of Crimea by Russian forces and its subsequent annexation by Russia, the EU, 
together with the US, imposed economic sanctions against the Kremlin on 17 March 2014 (Sakwa, 
2015: 187). Further rounds of sanctions were implemented in April and again in July following the 
downing of the Malaysian Airlines passenger plane MH17 (Anderson, 2015: 26). EU policy was now 
increasingly focused on Russia. The Kremlin was held responsible for further destabilisations in 
Ukraine, and Putin’s decisions were seen as either solving or escalating the conflict. Alongside the 
imposing of individual and sector-specific sanctions, EU leaders engaged in international diplomatic 
efforts, with marathon negotiations between chancellor Merkel and presidents Hollande, Putin and 
Poroshenko in Minsk on 12 February 2015 representing the most high-profile efforts since the 
beginning of the conflict. 
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Table 2. The aggregate shares of ‘national politics’, ‘international politics’ and ‘violence and war’ 
of all visual and textual news topics in each of the analysed periods (N=402). 
 
News topic Maidan Odessa MH17 Minsk 
National politics (visual) 46.7 18.0 6.0 6.4 
International politics (visual) 13.3 14.0 21.4 34.0 
Violence and war (visual) 24.4 50.0 58.3 46.8 
National politics (textual) 44.4 20.0 3.0 3.2 
International politics (textual) 23.3 20.0 38.1 50.0 
Violence and war (textual) 22.2 50.0 42.9 40.4 
 
 
The EU’s policy of disregarding the domestic social bases of the eastern insurgency and the rendering 
of the Ukrainian conflict into a problem of primarily Russian intervention had clear parallels in the 
newspapers’ coverage of the conflict. Table 2 summarises the shares of the three most dominant 
visual and textual topics in each of the studied periods. The images of Ukrainian political leaders and 
civil society actors and the textual references to them in the headlines were labelled ‘national politics’; 
images of foreign leaders and references to foreign powers were coded under the topic of 
‘international politics’; and visual and textual references to weapons, soldiers, battles, deaths and 
destruction were placed in the topic of ‘violence and war’. As the table indicates, a military focus 
took over the newspapers as the violence in eastern Ukraine escalated. Accordingly, developments 
were increasingly narrated in terms of advancing or retreating troops, clashes and battles, losses on 
both sides and civilian casualties. Simultaneously, there was a marked shift of focus away from 
Ukrainian political leaders and civil society and a move towards discussing the role of foreign powers 
in the conflict. After Odessa, the studied newspapers largely neglected the Ukrainian government as 
a significant actor in the conflict, and the political leadership of the Donbas rebels was almost entirely 
dismissed. No power within the country appeared to be responsible for the ongoing violence. Instead, 
the papers increasingly observed the conflict from the perspective of international politics, implying 
that Ukraine was a battleground for external powers. 
 
The increasing focus on the international dimensions of the conflict in July 2014 was set against the 
shooting down of the Malaysian Airlines passenger plane. The now prevalent news topic of violence 
and war (see Table 2) was comprised of images of destruction, casualties and civilian mourning, yet 
this time the victims were overwhelmingly of Western European and Asian origin. The papers 
reflected this internationalisation of the conflict’s humanitarian impact by adopting morally charged 
language. Headlines such as ‘Who shot at flight MH17?’ (Die Welt, 19 July), ‘Who killed them?’ 
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(HS, 19 July), ‘Putin seems to have been caught red-handed’ (DN, 19 July) and ‘MH17: the evidence 
against Russia’ (The Guardian, 20 July) illustrate how the papers alerted audiences that a criminal 
act had been committed and directed the public to look for a party to blame.  
 
This framing of the event as an international atrocity coincided with heightened attention on Russia. 
Table 3 compares the papers according to the frequency of articles – as a share of all articles they 
published in each period – that focused on Putin or Russia in their images or headline without 
referring to the presence of other actors. As the table indicates, close to every fourth article published 
in Die Welt, DN, and The Guardian over the MH17 period focused attention on Putin or Russia, 
constructing a strong association of Russia with responsibility for the disaster. Not only did the papers 
imply the criminality of the Kremlin’s actions in Ukraine, the MH17 coverage reinforced the 
representation of Russia as Europe’s enemy and Western citizens as its victims. This cold war-like 
juxtaposition contributed to the seeming rationality of the new round of sanctions against Russia, 
swiftly announced by the EU on 24 July. In marked contrast to the other papers, HS was notably 
restrained in singling out Russia during this period, publishing only two images of Putin and focusing 
its headlines on European political reactions to the incident. 
 
Table 3. Articles emphasising Russia’s actions and responsibility in the conflict in headlines or 
images (as a proportion of all articles published by the paper in the period). 
 
Newspaper Maidan Odessa MH17 Minsk Total 
The Guardian (online) 15.6 6.7 22.0 18.8 18.6 
Die Welt 12.5 8.3 28.1 20.0 20.0 
Dagens Nyheter 14.3 14.3 23.1 14.3 17.3 
Helsingin Sanomat 9.5 0.0 7.1 8.7 7.4 
 
 
Minsk: Proxy war 
 
If the MH17 coverage directed attention to the intervention of foreign powers in the Ukrainian 
conflict, the Minsk negotiations in February 2015 crystallised their roles in it. During this period, as 
Table 2 indicates, the visual and textual emphasis on warfare in the papers was complemented with 
attention on foreign political leaders and the simultaneous disregard of Ukrainian political actors. The 
marginalisation of Poroshenko, the total dismissal of the presence of the rebel leadership, and the 
emphasis on Putin, Merkel and Hollande in the coverage of the ceasefire negotiations reinforced the 
sense of outside powers overseeing the actual fighting in Ukraine. The coverage thus amounted to a 
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cold war-like framing of the events as a proxy war in which the Ukrainians were the fighters and 
victims of a confrontation between the Western European leaders and Putin. 
 
As was the case in the MH17 period, three of the four papers frequently directed attention toward 
Russia’s role and responsibility in the conflict (see Table 3). DN cynically declared Putin as ‘the 
winner’ of the ‘weak peace agreement’ that was unlikely to end the fighting in Ukraine (13 February 
2015). The paper thus continued its consistent pattern of implicating Putin as the driver of violence 
in Ukraine by use of headlines such as ‘Moscow’s men shoot while Putin follows the Olympics’ (23 
February 2014), ‘Stop the Kremlin predator’ (3 May 2014) and ‘Putin’s missiles’ (21 July 2014). Die 
Welt characterised Putin in similarly derogative terms, including ‘security risk’ (14 February 2015) 
and ‘power-obsessed’ (15 February 2015), and it also assumed the role of the EU’s and its own 
government’s cheerleader by praising Merkel’s leadership role in the peace negotiations. In 
comparison, The Guardian was more restrained in its representations of Putin during this period and 
took a critical distance from Western leaders, too, presenting a rather non-partisan view of the 
geopolitics of the conflict. HS, in turn, was again careful not to demonise or isolate Putin, but the 
paper nevertheless aligned itself with the Western perspective by joining its German counterpart in 
an exaltation of Merkel’s ‘ceaseless peace efforts’ (13 February).  
 
Discussion 
As far as the framing of a foreign conflict is concerned, news is a fragmentary entity. The coverage 
of events in any newspaper always offers several alternative and often contradictory readings 
(Vliegenthart and van Zoonen, 2011). Yet we found common patterns in the framing of the Ukrainian 
conflict, which were reproduced to varying degrees of forcefulness in the studied newspapers. Firstly, 
Ukrainian actors, including political leaders, demonstrators, police, volunteer militias and military 
servicemen, were mostly presented in a positive manner and their perspectives were identified with 
when they were considered ‘pro-European’, whereas actors identified as ‘pro-Russian’ were mostly 
represented as aggressive and threatening and their viewpoints remained largely obscure. The notable 
exception to this general rule was ordinary citizens; when identified as the private opinions of 
‘civilians’, views antithetical to the legitimacy of the Western supported Kiev government were 
validated. Secondly, Russian involvement in the events was emphasised above all other powers, 
including the Ukrainian government and rebel leadership. Coupled with primarily negative 
representations of Putin, the focus on Russia tended to suggest that only one party was to blame for 
the conflict and that this party therefore held the keys to its solution. It also undermined framings 
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which would question the legitimacy of Ukraine’s present regime and the role of the EU, the US and 
NATO in increasing international tensions and divisions within Ukraine. 
 
Due to the tendency of the elite press to frame foreign news in close concordance with national foreign 
policy establishments (Herman and Chomsky 2008; Lawrence, 2010), the extent to which the four 
papers conformed to or deviated from this shared framing pattern may reflect some of the national 
differences within the EU concerning the Ukrainian conflict. Of the studied countries, the UK and 
Sweden, in particular, have assumed active roles in driving EU sanctions against Russia (ECFR, 
2015), whereas the German and Finnish governments have been more restrained in this regard (Pond 
and Kundnani, 2015; Rossi, 2014). Indeed, EU policy making in the conflict has been internally 
conflicted due to the vastly differing histories, positions and foreign policy traditions of its member 
states with regard to Russia, and to some degree, these national policy preferences may be reflected 
in the studied newspapers. In particular, this may be the case with Helsingin Sanomat’s notable 
moderate line, compared to the other newspapers, in its representations of Russia’s role in the 
conflict.5 
 
Yet despite their differences, the papers’ dominant framing patterns largely aligned them with the 
‘Western’ position in the conflict while alienating Russia. During its various stages, official EU policy 
in the Ukrainian conflict has primarily consisted of supporting the Maidan movement; politically 
opposing the Yanukovych government; legitimising the regime change and Ukraine’s ‘pro-European’ 
leadership; finalising the association agreement with Ukraine; supporting the Ukrainian government 
and providing it with ‘non-lethal’ military assistance in its military campaign against the insurgency; 
and extending economic and political sanctions against Russia (Anderson, 2015; Sakwa, 2015). These 
policies, coordinated with the United States, have partly rested on favourable public opinion within 
Western Europe, which is based on a perception of the Russian president as the culprit and aggressor 
and the Ukrainian government as the victim of a foreign attack (Pew Research Center, 2015). Our 
analysis suggests that the studied newspapers have framed key events in the conflict in ways that have 
largely validated such interpretations.  
 
The limited size of the analyzed material cautions against generalizing such conclusions, and research 
with larger data sets would be required to complement the findings of this study. Neither are the 
results meant to be read as an assessment of how the national news media of the studied countries as 
a whole have framed the conflict. Nevertheless, our study seems to corroborate earlier findings 
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concerning the role of the media in actively reproducing elite foreign policy frames as well as 
dominant geopolitical imaginaries (Ojala, 2011; Reese, 2010; Robison, 2004; Tsatsou and 
Armstrong, 2014). According to this perspective, the news media have largely promoted versions of 
events that legitimise the EU’s position on the conflict because the ‘new cold war’ as a geopolitical 
narrative has provided the journalists with a simple and highly suggestive prism through which to 
report and explain the events and what the conflict is about. Indeed, the findings indicate that, as the 
Ukrainian conflict has evolved, the news media have adopted an increasingly consistent perspective 
on the events so as to reproduce an underlying geopolitical narrative of the conflict in terms of a 
superpower conflict between East and West. A case for future research is to delve into specific 
journalistic mechanisms and practices – including the socialisation of journalists into professional 
cultures and their sourcing practices – through which geopolitical imaginaries become embedded in 
international journalism as heuristic devices that lead to their reproduction as news frames. 
 
In this naturalisation of geopolitical interests and identities (Mamadouh and Dijkink, 2006), the 
newspapers should not be considered merely as passive message carriers in the service of national 
and European elites. The prevalence of violent imagery in the visual framing of the conflict, for 
instance, suggests the newspapers have been active in creating a sense of urgency, thus potentially 
contributing to the public pressure and sense of moral obligation for EU governments to intervene in 
the conflict (cf. Chouliaraki, 2008; Hammond, 2000).  
 
Moreover, instead of merely legitimising EU policies, the press may have played a part in directing 
the policy response by restricting the range of available policy options. By promoting simplistic 
representations of geopolitical realities and Putin as the enemy of the West, the national news media 
in Europe may be contributing to a climate of public opinion in which EU leaders need to be careful 
not to appear to be appeasing Russia. More fundamentally, national newspapers may be reproducing 
a geopolitical narrative which renders it rational to continue to escalate a NATO-Russia conflict, 
despite frequent warnings of where such military logic can lead (Frear et al., 2015). If the ‘new cold 
war’ narrative of international relations takes hold in the news, it not only obscures the complex 
international security questions of today (Monaghan, 2015), but it also hinders a deeper understanding 
of the Ukrainian conflict by reducing it to a theatre for the clash of seemingly irreconcilable East-
West divisions. 
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1. Die Welt is the third-largest national daily in Germany with a circulation of 190,000; The Guardian 
ranks third among the British quality dailies with a circulation of 164,000; Dagens Nyheter has the 
largest circulation among the Swedish morning newspapers with 280,000 copies; and Helsingin 
Sanomat is the largest subscription newspaper in Finland with a circulation of 267,000. 
 
2. Using the daily archive provided by theguardian.com (see 
http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian), we selected only those online articles which also appeared 
in the printed edition of the newspaper. The online versions of the articles tend to differ from those 
published in print with regard to length, headlines and photos used, and they also sometimes contained 
videos, which were included in the analysis. The conclusions concerning The Guardian articles are 
therefore only partly applicable to the printed edition of the paper. 
 
3. The literature on the Ukrainian conflict consulted at this stage consisted of Sakwa (2015), 
Ishchenko (2014; 2015), Gessen (2014), Pikulicka-Wilczewska and Sakwa (2015), Boyd-Barrett 
(2015), and Haukkala (2015), along with a number of newspaper and magazine articles by foreign 
policy experts. 
 
4. Our observations on EU policy and on its positions on the conflict are based on research literature 
(see note 2), as well as on the official decisions and statements of the EU Council of Ministers and 
Foreign Affairs Council during the analysed events.  
 
5. Paper-specific editorial slants may also account for some of the perceived differences. Die Welt’s 
coverage as a market liberal newspaper can be read as an expression of a committed pro-Western 
stance within a highly charged political debate in Germany (Neukirch, 2014), and DN's demonising 
representations of Putin can be understood as the intentional choice of a paper which has actively 
Notes 
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promoted NATO membership for Sweden (Nohrstedt and Ottosen, 2014: 105). 
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